The term depersonalization has been vaguely used in clinical contexts and there is confusion over its nosological positioning. Although the syndrome has been assigned a niche of its own in the European psychiatric taxonomy, the American's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III, IV) labeled it under the term Dissociative Disorder. The latter, which does not agree with the classical theory of Janet, seems to have no basis on traditional psychopathology and is not derived from any dissociative theories. In this paper the descriptive characteristics of depersonalization are discussed with regard to the features of "observing self" and the relationship between experiences and selves, according to which the authors distinguish two types of depersonalization: an "excessive-self-reflecting type" and an "absorbed-in-experience type". Whereas the former coinsides with the typical depersonalization neurosis, in which excessive self-reflection plays an important role in reducing the sense of reality, in the latter over-absorption in some situations leads the patient to construct a wall to block out reality. We suggest that in making a distinction between these two types, the psychopathology of depersonalization will be better clarified.