A perfectly free, competitive medical market would not meet many social goals, such as universal access to health care. Micromanagement of interactions between patients and providers does not guarantee quality care and frequently undermines that relationship, to the frustration of all involved. Furthermore, while some North American health care plans are less expensive than others, none have reduced the medical inflation rate to equal the general inflation rate. Markets have always fixed uneven inflation rates in other domains. The suggested reforms could make elective interactions between patients and providers work more like a free market than did any preceding system. The health and life insurance plan creates cost-sensitive consumers, informed by a corporation with significant research incentives and abilities. The FFEB proposal encourages context-sensitive pricing, established by negotiation processes that weigh labor and benefit. Publication of providers' expected outcomes further enriches the information available to consumers and may reduce defensive medicine incentives. A medical career ladder would ease entry and exit from medical professions. These and complementary reforms do not specifically cap spending yet could have a deflationary impact on elective health care prices, while providing incentives to maintain quality. They accomplish these ends by giving more responsibility, information, incentives, and choice to citizens. We could provide most health care in a marketlike environment. We can incorporate these reforms in any convenient order and allow them to compete with alternative schemes. Our next challenge is to design, implement, and evaluate marketlike health care systems.